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SOME THOUGHTS ON BEGINNINGS AND
ENDS: COURT OF APPEALS REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES'
FINDINGS AND OPINIONS*
PATRICIA M. WALD**
It is a unique pleasure to address administrative law judges (ALJs). I
think of ALJs as being "present at the creation" of most of the cases that
eventually wind their way to the D.C. Circuit. In fact, in the most recent
year for which statistics are available, well over half the cases in our
circuit came directly from the agencies,1 and in a large number of those
an ALJ made the initial decision. And while you launch these cases, we
represent the end of the road for most of those same litigants: even in
our worst year, the Supreme Court took up fewer than one percent of our
cases. So between us, we control a good bit of the administrative process.
In my heart of hearts, I think that you have the more important role.
You, with the help of counsel, define the issues, lay down the law at least
preliminarily, and, most important, make the findings of fact that drive
the rest of the process. I may be prejudiced in this vein. I started my
career as a law clerk to Judge Jerome Frank of the Second Circuit, a
"legal realist" whose course at Yale Law School was titled "Fact Find-
ing." Judge Frank stoutly maintained that whoever found the facts con-
* This article was originally given as a speech at the Federal Administrative Law Judges'
Conference in Washington, D.C. on November 18, 1988.
** Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
L 1988 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL COURT MAN-
AGEMENT STATISTICS 2 (twelve-month period ended June 30, 1988).
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trolled the outcome of the case. On reflection some thirty-five years
later, I think he was probably fight.
It is also interesting to me that what administrative law cognoscenti
have recognized up to now as the de facto power of a factfinder increas-
ingly is being translated into de jure power. More and more proposals
for administrative change are coming down the pike, including, for ex-
ample, the creation of new article I courts for veterans' claims2 and pro-
posals to do the same for social security claims.3 Many of these
proposals would make the ALJs' factual determinations conclusive or
reviewable only for the most egregious errors.4 So yours is a growth
stock. This consensus in favor of more power in the factfinder comes,
perhaps ironically for us court of appeals judges, at a time when there are
loud, even strident, calls for judicial restraint on the part of article III
judges- demands that we interfere less in the agencies' business and stop
second guessing their judgment calls.
It is an interesting dichotomy, but I would guess that your ascendant
power is an inevitable phenomenon. So long as agencies handle more
and more disputes between citizens and their government in more and
more specialized subject matter areas as I think that they will-notwith-
standing the occasional campaign rhetoric to the contrary-and so long
as there is a simultaneous reluctance to increase the numbers of article
III judges indefinitely, more power is going to be lodged at your level.
There is general agreement among article III judges that we do not want
to grow in numbers. I have just come from a historic gathering (the first
in 200 years) of all the federal courts of appeals judges in the nation, and
that is the definite consensus: we don't want our group to get much big-
ger. That means, then, that proposals to limit our scope of review, par-
ticularly in the factfinding area, will be considered carefully. So your star
is on the rise, and, if ours is not on the wane, it is at least fixed for a time.
I do not need to tell you that with any power surge comes increased
2. Congress recently enacted the Veterans' Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 301,
102 Stat. 4105 (1988) (to be codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4051-4092), which created a new United States
Court of Veterans Appeals under article I of the Constitution.
3. See Court Idea Revived, NAT'L. LJ., March 24, 1986, at 2 (reporting a proposal for the
creation of a new, specialized article I court to deal with disability and other social security claims).
4. These proposals would move the agency adjudication process in the direction of the model
established under the federal child labor laws, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 212, 216(e) (1982), where the ALJ's
decision is the final-le., unreviewable-action within the Department of Labor. See generally
Cass, Allocation of Authority within Bureaucracies: Empirical Evidence and Normative Analysis, 66
B.U.L. REv. 1, 10-14 & n.48 (1986).
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responsibility. ALJs, not appellate court judges, are likely to become the
court of last resort for many more litigants. In that context, maintaining
your independence and integrity becomes ever more critical. And that is
not always easy. You, in contrast to us, do not have life tenure and your
duties and assignments may be changed at the behest of the agency.
Thus, I believe that ongoing efforts by ALJs to distance yourselves from
specific agency sponsors, and to build a reputation and a reality of profes-
sionalism and independence, are tremendously important to the future of
administrative law as a whole. Only an impressive track record will con-
vince a disgruntled citizen that an umpire hired by the agency is really
going to give her a square deal.5 And, of course, it is hard to work in and
for an agency and not be subtly affected by its priorities and even
prejudices. The AL has to enforce the law pretty much as laid down by
the agency and the courts. But when the goals of the agency drive hard
in one direction, it takes courage and intellectual discipline to find the
facts impartially if they point to a result in the other direction. Yet that
is precisely what ALJs must do now and with even more frequency in the
future.
Moreover, the smaller the claim and the more insignificant the claim-
ant, the greater the ALJ's responsibility is. I do not, for instance, envy
the ALJs in the social security disability and labor law fields, or the im-
migration officers at the Department of Justice. Their caseloads are stag-
gering; the policymakers cannot help but think in terms of missions,
priorities, numbers, and even occasionally dollar signs. Yet, in such
areas the ALJs must play God. Their conscience and professionalism are
often their only guide. At every important juncture in our history and at
every level of adjudication, truly independent judges have courted rejec-
tion, calumny, and misunderstanding by their bosses and even the public.
We all feel occasionally like the spy who wants to come in from the cold
and enjoy the approbation of going with the flow. But resisting such
temptations is, in the final analysis, what judging is all about. Enough
said-I know I preach to the converted. You ALJs are the real freedom
fighters in my book, and I only wish the national budget reflected that
truth.
I do wonder, however, for the future of your corps if we-the govern-
ment as a whole-pay as much attention to many factors in ALJ selec-
tion as we should. We commonly seek to ensure that a candidate
5. For a recent example of the skepticism that ALJs must confront regularly, see Tolchin, Are
Judge and Agency Too Close for Justice?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1988, § 4 at 2, col. 3.
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possesses such qualities as intellectual acumen and acquired expertise,
but we might probe more deeply into a potential ALJ's judicial tempera-
ment, lack of bias, impartiality, signs of courage and integrity in his or
her past history, and willingness to take principled stands against the
mainstream when necessary. A good civil servant does not automatically
make a good AL. ALJ positions should not be rewards for good sol-
diering on the agency's behalf. The Europeans may have a leg up on us
in designing career ladders for their judges that include stints in the gov-
ernment bureaus as hearing officers, and that provide for upward mobil-
ity from there into the civil courts.
Our tradition of appointing article III judges is a much different one,
relying more heavily on political factors and philosophical congruence
with the administration in power. But the intransigence of that tradition
should not prevent us from looking hard at our selection processes for
ALJs, especially as they assume ever more critical functions in our deci-
sional processes. For instance, I was shocked to learn of the low percent-
age of women who have been appointed ALJs: as of September 1988,
only 4.1% of federal administrative law judges were women. I am
equally disturbed by the low representation of minorities in the ALJ
ranks: approximately 94% of ALJs are white.6 Certainly the same needs
for diversity and representativeness among judges applies at the ALJ
level as at the appellate court judge level. Both of our benches dispense
justice to all segments of the population, and our composite profiles
ought to send the message that our ranks are open to everyone of ability.
It is a goal for which all of us should be fighting together.
On another front, I am glad to see over the years the greater integra-
tion of ALJs into our judges' professional groups: the ABA, the National
Association of Women Judges, and even our newly formed Washington-
based Administrative Law Inn of Court. We have much to learn from
each other.
But now for a minute to descend from the macro to the micro. Even
without any increases in responsibility, the ALJs' findings and reasoning
already dominate the administrative law process. They are the starting
point for the rest of us. I recognize, of course, that the Supreme Court
told article III courts a long time ago that they do not directly review an
ALJ's findings, but rather must focus on the agency's decision.7 In doing
6. These figures were obtained from the Office of Administrative Law Judges in the Office of
Personnel Management, Washington, D.C., and are current as of September 1988.
7. See, e.g., FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358 (1955); Universal Camera
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so, however, reviewing judges are allowed and indeed instructed to take
into account the AUI's findings as part of the overall mix of data from
which the court must decide whether or not "substantial evidence" sup-
ports the agency's decision.' And on the court of appeals we do try con-
scientiously to adhere to that mandate.
As you know, many of our administrative law cases involve complex
facts and highly technical subject matters. While we have the duty to
familiarize ourselves with the subject matter of each case we consider-
no matter how arcane-so that we can make responsible judgments as to
whether an agency acted within reasonable bounds, the volume of our
business necessitates taking short cuts. Up there in our ivory tower, we
have limited expertise and resources to absorb, synthesize, and accom-
modate all of the facts and evidence presented by parties throughout the
adversarial process. Even if we immerse ourselves ad infinitum and ad
nauseam in the technical details of the record, a practice of which I have
often been accused, still we are often left groping for the more elusive,
intuitive grasp of the essence of a case. Over time we have developed a
number of doctrinal devices to deal with our inherent limitations: we say
we police the consistency and procedural regularity of agency decision-
making, and that we require an explanation for any departure from past
policies of the agency'; we insist on being able to discern the path of the
decisionmaker, insuring, as Judge Harold Leventhal has said, that she
does not cross the line from the "tolerably terse" to the "intolerably
mute""1; and we take a "hard look" to assure that the agency has ade-
quately considered all the relevant factors in a case.11
But most often the best initial hold a reviewing court can get on the
case as a whole comes from the findings and opinion of the AL. The
AL's decision cannot of course be determinative on review, but it often
provides the most dispassionate voice in the record. When I first came
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 492-97 (1951). See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 17.16 (2d ed. 1980).
8. Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 496-97.
9. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851-52 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. de-
nied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
10. Id. at 852.
11. See, e.g., Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 520 & n.33
(DC. Cir. 1983) (borrowing Judge Leventhal's phrase to suggest that we must "take a 'hard look' at
both the facts and the agency's reasoning" (citation omitted)). See also Leventhal, Environmental
Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 514 (1974) ("The court does
not make the ultimate decision, but it insists that the agency take a 'hard look' at all relevant
factors.").
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onto the court of appeals, Malcolm Wilkey, then my senior by ten years,
told me that in an agency case I should go first to the ALJ opinion, then
to the agency decision, then, in the remaining time, to the briefs. And
that was in the main good advice.
A reviewing court will generally use the ALJ's recommended decision
as the benchmark for its first impression on agency reasonableness. If an
agency affirms the ALJ's findings, there arises an informal presumption
of normalcy in the proceedings. But a reviewing court's antenna picks it
up immediately when the agency has reversed or overridden in substan-
tial part the ALJ's decision, particularly findings of fact. It is simply a
fact of administrative life that when two primary decisionmakers disa-
gree, a reviewing court will be especially careful to find out why, whereas
when the agency head affirms the AL's decision, the challenger has a
very heavy burden to bear. When there is disagreement, some of us, es-
pecially those who have worked elsewhere in government, may harbor a
scintilla of suspicion that the politically appointed top level policymakers
in an agency are more likely caught up in the pursuit of the agency's
current mission or immediate goals than the ALJ at the bottom of the
process who listens to the evidence. I think we give you, the ALJ, our
closest attention in most such cases. Of course, the agency always has
the last word on policy, and its interpretation of statutory law, if reason-
able, will prevail when we do not think Congress has spoken to the pre-
cise issue. But when your board or commission finds the facts differently
from you, we generally apply something of a strict scrutiny standard.
Some courts of appeals have come right out and said it: when an agency
departs from an ALJ's findings, "it must explain why."' 2
I recently conducted an informal survey of administrative law opinions
handed down by the D.C. Circuit in the first several months of 1988 in
cases that had originated before ALJs. Having involved only twenty-
four cases, my analysis did not rise to the level of "statistical signifi-
cance"; still, it confirmed my general impression of how important a role
ALJs' work plays in the review process. First of all, as I went looking for
how the court treats ALJs' findings, I was struck by the matter-of-fact-
ness with which courts and agencies alike rely on the ALJs' factfindings
as determinative in the overwhelming majority of cases. But even be-
yond the factual determinations, the reviewing bodies most often fell in
line with the ALJ's overall legal analysis: in two-thirds of the cases that
12. ITT Continental Baking Co. v. FTC, 532 F.2d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 1976).
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reached our court for review, both the agency and the court affirmed the
ALJ's decision. 3 Perhaps most interesting, of the six cases where the
agency disagreed with the ALJ's recommended decision,'4 the court set
aside the agency action in all but two. 5 That says something!
A closer look at a few of the cases in the sample reveals some of the
dynamics that go on between the appellate courts, the ALJs, and the
agency middle man. When you base your findings clearly on the credibil-
ity or demeanor of witnesses, you are at your zenith of power, even when
there are conflicting stories. In one recent case, we said: "We must ac-
cept the ALJ's credibility determinations, as adopted by the Board, un-
less they are patently insupportable."' 6 And in only one case out of
twenty-four did we find an ALJ's findings "inherently incredible."' 7 But
a word of advice: when you are basing your findings on the credibility of
witnesses, it is wise to say so. If you do not clearly identify the source of
your findings, there is much more room for interpretation by a reviewing
agency or court as to whether your ultimate findings were indeed secon-
dary or derivative or inferential, and not based on witness credibility. If
they are perceived as secondary or inferential, and the agency subse-
quently overrules you, there is a greater chance we will go along with the
agency, as indeed we did in one case in my sample.' 8 However, even that
case produced a spirited dissent on our court citing the "ill-conceived, ill-
reasoned reversal of [the] Administrative Law Judge."' 9
With remedies as well, because they are seen as partaking more of pol-
icy judgments, we are likely to give the agency the benefit of the doubt if
it adopts a remedy different from that selected by an AL. And, of
course, if the ALJ or the agency uses the wrong legal standard in a deci-
13. See, e.g., Comuni-Centre Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 856 F.2d 1551 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1539 (1989); Simpson v. Young, 854 F.2d 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United Food and
Commercial Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 852 F.2d 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Boilermakers Local
No. 374 v. NLRB, 852 F.2d 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
14. See G.W. Galloway Co. v. NLRB, 856 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Drexel Burnham Lam-
bert, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 850 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Chirino v. Na-
tional Transp. Safety Bd., 849 F.2d 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Dart v. United States, 848 F.2d 217 (D.C.
Cir. 1988); Simpson v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 842 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir.
1988); Leeward Auto Wreckers, Inc. v. NLRB, 841 F.2d 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
15. See Drexel, 850 F.2d at 753; Chirino, 849 F.2d at 1530-31.
16. NLRB v. Creative Food Design Ltd., 852 F.2d 1295, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
17. Chirino v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 849 F.2d 1525, 1530 n. 6 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
18. Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 850 F.2d 742
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
19. Id. at 756 (Starr, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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sion, we will reverse and remand. Customary deference notwithstanding,
in several cases where the agency had overturned the ALJ, our court
literally scoured the record, only to conclude ultimately that the board
did not have substantial evidence for overturning the AL's findings. In
one case, the court said that the basis of the board's mistake lay in some
confusing "dictum" by the AL. 2 The message there, I suppose, is to
keep your findings crisp and clean.
And finally, I would note that your factfinding power is sometimes
downright scary. In a recent disability case, an ALJ denied benefits to a
claimant who alleged that stress originating in work conditions caused
his heart attack.2 Despite a long series of cases upholding benefits in
work-stress related heart attack cases, the court stuck with the AL's
finding, over conflicting testimony, that work related stress had not
caused this particular attack.22
Because of the importance of your factfinding at all subsequent stages,
I view with some interest recent debates about how detailed or sparse
AL opinions should be.2" From my viewpoint an opinion by an ALJ
can and should do more than merely lay out the bare minimum of find-
ings necessary to reach the legal conclusion in a given dispute. The
AL's opinion is the reviewing court's first introduction to the case, and
it should therefore spell out essentially everything the reviewing court
needs to know. Thus, while like motherhood and apple pie, we all favor
administrative as well as judicial succinctness, an overly terse ALU opin-
ion has lost sight of its audience.
You are writing for judicial readers down the road who may not and,
in fact, probably will not, read for themselves all the testimony you have
heard. ALJs thus need to lay out for us not only the critical findings, but
the basis on which they have made them, even spoon feeding us the rec-
ord cites for the most important findings. You need to distinguish be-
tween the primary findings based on witnesses or documents and the
secondary inferences you draw from those sources. You need to draw us
a map of how both your primary and secondary findings lead you to your
20. Simpson v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 842 F.2d 453, 461 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
21. Whitmore v. AFIA Worldwide Insurance, 837 F.2d 513 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
22. Id. at 516.
23. For an articulate argument that ALJ opinions should become "very sparse," freeing Al~s
to "leapfrog [from facts] to the conclusions of law," see the remarks of the Hon. Jean F. Green.
Greene, Keppel & Gelpe, Fact-Finding and Opinion Writing for Administrative Law Judges, 4 LAW
AND INEQUALITY 91, 94 (1986).
[Vol. 67:661
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss3/2
REVIEW OF AL FINDINGS
conclusions of law, and what legal standards you are applying to the
facts. Very often we end up reviewing an ALJ's opinion directly when
the agency adopts it as its own. Thus, the more explicit the connections
you draw between facts and law, the easier you make our job. A rough
count of our recent agency remands reveals that in approximately half
the cases, the cause of the remand was the court's inability to understand
or accept the decisionmaker's path of reasoning. We did not say that
they were wrong, only that we could not figure out how they got from
here to there. "Failure to adequately explicate" is the term of art used
for our inability to figure out what an agency was doing or where it was
going. Instead of spending so much time moot-courting the agency law-
yers who come into court to argue for decisions already made, I think
more agency resources ought to be spent in moot-courting the rationales
and decisions themselves. I am not sure how this would work with
ALJs, but I know that with article III judges, one's colleagues often suc-
ceed in picking up inconsistencies and gaps in one's reasoning or clarity
that may produce confusion if left uncorrected. Many remands could be
avoided by some comparable internal review process at all stages of
agency decisionmaking. You may sometimes forget it, but we are gener-
alists up here with limited capacities. As individual judges we sit on only
a dozen or so cases from any given agency each year. In most instances,
we need an extensive education as to what the case is all about. Con-
versely, we are also ornery critters who do not always react well if we
think someone is trying to overwhelm us with jargon and complex con-
cepts. Having a colleague read a proposed decision can often help this
entire process along.
I hope that I have not bored you with the obvious. In a nutshell, and
without idle flattery, you are probably the most critical part of the ad-
ministrative process. If you get it right, the rest goes smoothly, almost
automatically. If you do not, there are apt to be "searching reviews,"
remands, and inefficient repeats of the process. We on the court of ap-
peals always look carefully-and usually first-at what you do; your
work is never wasted or ignored, believe me. But in a more basic sense,
we also look for you to do the right thing-to provide the non-mission
oriented appraisal of the case for us to consider. In some agencies that
takes great courage. But if you don't take that first principled step, you
cut off our options up the line. Yours is a hard job, but an essential one if
citizens are to retain their faith in a fair government and if our two
1989]
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branches of government are to work together in harmony. I know you
are up to the job, and I wish you well.
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